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Abstract:
We explore the implications of trade liberalization in economies with State Owned
enterprises (SOEs) and shirking. SOEs are modelled as controlled by the members of the
enterprise who determine output and effort levels, while facing output prices and wage rates set
by government. Enterprise members must collectively meet a budget constraint that the value of
sales equals the enterprise wage bill plus an exogenous enterprise commitment to the state
budget. Labour can shirk either through low on the job effort (leisure), or through moonlighting
to second jobs in the private sector. Three alternative formulations of equilibria in SOE
economies are explored, and in these trade liberalization can produce effects opposite from
conventional competitive models. In particular, the output of import competing SOEs increases
rather than falls, and negative effects on imports can also occur. These models when calibrated to
1995 data for Vietnam also suggest quantitatively much larger impacts from trade liberalization
than is the case for comparable conventional competitive models. This is  because departures
from Pareto optimality in SOE economies can be large and trade liberalization acts to discipline
shirking associated with these inefficiencies. The implication we draw from our analysis is that
to evaluate policy initiatives, such as trade liberalization, in developing and transition economies
without explicitly recognizing the role that SOE’s can play may be misleading. This is especially
the case where SOEs account for a significant fraction of economic activity and shirking is
involved.
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INTRODUCTION
Even though developing and transition economies have undergone extensive policy reform
over the last 10-15 years, a persistent feature of many of these economies is a significance presence
for state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) (see World Bank (1995), p 29).  Depending upon the economy
under consideration, these often provide the dominant mode of organization in large scale and heavy
manufacturing (steel, power, cement), as well as in financial and distribution sectors. In 1995 in
Vietnam, for instance, SOEs were estimated to still account for around 30% of non-agricultural
employment, and 43% of non-agricultural value added2.  
Despite a large SOE presence in such economies, there has been relatively little analytical
work done on them; including what objective function should be specified for them, what their
optimizing behaviour is; and, more specifically, how they change conventional analyses of policy
reform, such as trade liberalization. Much of the available literature either documents their extent
(Jefferson and Singh (1999) provide a recent discussion of the SOE reform in China, largely
providing data on their performance),  empirically evaluates the relative performance of public and
private enterprises (Caves and Christensen (1980), Boardman and Vining (1989), Bennett and
Johnson (1979)), or evaluates the impact of incentive structures on SOE performance (Groves, Hong,
McMillian and Naughton (1994)). Little or none of this literature discusses the impact that SOEs
have on the comparative statics of policy reform within an economy wide analytical framework .
Here we use three related formulations of economies with state owned enterprises to analyze
the implications for trade related policy reform. Our purpose is to show how different the analysis
of the impacts of trade liberalization can become in the presence of SOEs, both quantitatively and
23 There is wide spread anecdotal evidence to support these characterizations. As the World Bank
(1995) publication “Bureaucrats in Business” puts it,  “Government employees operate a casino in Ghana,
bake cookies in Egypt, assemble watches in India, mine salt in Mexico, make matches in Mali, and bottle
cooking oil in Senegal.” (p.1)
qualitatively, more so than to claim we have a universal SOE formulation to be used everywhere,
since SOEs operate in different ways in different economies.  In our formulations employees are
assumed to run the enterprise with their collective interest in mind, but to do so within government
set rules. Thus, output prices and wage rates are set by government (a common practice), but
employees determine output levels, effort levels, and can also regulate entry into the enterprise work
force. We thus assume that, given output prices and wage rates, enterprise members jointly meet a
budget constraint which requires that the value of sales cover material costs and state obligations
(including interest), but once they have met this constraint they can shirk. They do this either by
taking part-time jobs outside the enterprise (again common in transition economies), or through
reduced effort3. Shirked labour may either be consumed as leisure, or be deployed (via part-time
jobs) in the private sector. In the open economy case, trade quotas are needed to support a SOE
equilibrium, since the prices set by government will typically depart from world prices. 
Our first formulation assumes as a simplification that in all sectors of the economy there are
only SOE enterprises. The membership of all enterprises is fixed, as are wage rates by sector.  The
government sets domestic prices for enterprise products and  supports these through a series of trade
quotas since the country involved is assumed to be price taker on world markets. Households
(labourers) in each sector have preferences defined over goods and leisure (shirked labour).  In
equilibrium, both output levels by enterprise and the degree of shirking in each sector is
endogenously determined. 
34 Although, typically, more general SOE reform precedes other policy reforms, such as in the trade
sector. See the discussion of the experience in Vietnam in O’ Connor (1995)
In our second formulation,  SOEs  and private enterprises coexist in each sector.  In contrast
to the first formulation, shirked labour from SOEs can now be used in the private sector which sells
separate and distinctive products and offers part-time jobs. Instead of shirking simply yielding
leisure, shirked labour can now be redeployed in the private sector. Trade liberalization which
disciplines SOEs will thus transfer shirked labour back from the private sector to the SOEs. 
Our third formulation, we use a mobility treatment in which SOE membership is no longer
fixed, but endogenously determined  to reflect migration decisions based on comparisons of the wage
in the private sector and the combined return from working (including the monetary value of the
marginal utility of shirking) in the SOE sector. In this formulation, equilibrium conditions link wage
rates across the two sectors via the marginal benefit of shirking in the SOE sector.
We model trade liberalization in all three formulations as eliminating trade quotas and
lowering domestic prices of previously protected products4. Given both the fixed membership of
enterprises producing such products and the enterprise budget constraint, this implies that  in our first
two formulations,  shirking will fall and the output in the import competing sector must increase (not
fall as is conventionally the case when protection is removed). Imports can thus fall rather than rise
under trade liberalization due to increased domestic production of import substituting state enterprise
sector products. Trade liberalization may or may not be welfare improving, depending upon whether
the marginal product of labour in any SOE impacted by the change is higher or lower than the
marginal value of leisure (or the marginal product of labour employed in the private sector
4formulation two). Typically, and as our results show, the quantitative effects on welfare (via changes
in shirking) of trade liberalization in such models will swamp those generated by conventional
competitive models.
We parameterize versions of all these models using data for Vietnam for 1995 and use
counterfactual experiments to analyze the impacts of trade liberalization in the presence of SOEs.
Model results serve to emphasize the themes for the paper set out above; output responses under
liberalization are perverse compared to traditional competitive models; imports can fall;
liberalization can be either welfare worsening or welfare improving; and quantitatively the effects
are typically much larger in  models with SOEs than in competitive models.  The conclusion we
draw  is that when looking at trade and other policy reform in developing and transition economies
in the presence of SOEs,  their potential impacts need to be more widely acknowledged and
explicitly incorporated than at present, since the analysis can be quite different from the competitive
case.
51. MODELS OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOUR WITH SHIRKING
A Basic Model
We begin with a simple model of a economy with SOEs,  into which we incorporate shirking
behaviour by members of the enterprise.  We assume each SOE produces a distinct product, that
labour is the sole variable input for each SOE, and there are decreasing returns to scale (reflecting
the presence of fixed capital). Each enterprise has a fixed work force , but only a portion , , ofL¯i λi
the labour available to it enters production due to shirking. 
Shirking arises in the model because each SOE has both a fixed membership and faces a
fixed (government determined) wage which is paid independently of the effort of employees. Once
minimum conditions for each worker’s effort level are met, the remaining effort can be shirked.
Shirking, in practice, will be reflected in limited effort being applied when at work, early departure
from and/or late arrival at work, labour supplied to second jobs, and other such phenomena.  For
simplicity, we assume that shirking occurs at a similar  level across all members of the enterprise.
This could be because members of the enterprise are able to monitor what all other members do, and
any deviation from common behaviour can be penalized by others in some way (social penalties
(displays of  disapproval),  for instance). Under this treatment,  becomes the variable input inλi
production for the enterprise.
We write each enterprise production function as
(1)YiAi (λi L¯i)
αi ( i1, ... N )
65We can also specify (1) as incorporating a sector specific factor  (capital), and write (1) asK¯i
. In this rewritten form,  still remains as  the only variable input and decreasingYi  Ai K¯
(1  αi )
i (λi L¯i )
αi λi
returns to the variable input still applies, even though the production function might appear to be written as
constant returns to scale.
6 There is no rationing on either side of the goods market.
where  denotes enterprise output;  is a unit term;  is the fraction of the potential labour inputYi Ai λi
actually applied to production in the enterprise; and  since we assume decreasing returns toαi <1
scale5.
The  budget constraint collectively faced by members of the enterprise is
(2)P¯i YiW¯i L¯i S¯i ( i1, ... N )
We assume that all workers in the enterprise receive a fixed wage   independently of  their effort;W¯i
the government controls the price of the output of the enterprise at  (a common although notP¯i
always uniform practice in developing/transition economies); and   is the level of contribution toS¯i
the state budget required from the enterprise, which we take to be exogenous.  In this case, simple
substitution of (1) into (2) determines , given  and .λi Ai αi
We assume that the government uses a set of binding quotas on net trades, (import and export
quotas, ) to support the government controlled output prices, . These allow domestic prices toNi P¯i
differ from given world prices, 6. The removal of these quotas under trade liberalization forcesP wi
domestic prices to equal world prices.
On the demand side of the economy, a representative household is assumed to reflect the
preferences of workers employed in each enterprise. This representative household maximizes a
utility function
; (j = 1,...N) (3)U i (G ij , (1λi) L¯i) ( i1... N )
77 These yield demands for commodities for workers from enterprise j for good i as 
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where is to the consumption of good j by labour (enterprise) type i, and  is the utility of theG ij Ui
representative  worker in enterprise i.  
We assume, for simplicity, that (3) is additively separable and can be written as
; (j = 1,...N) (5)U i(G ij )νi((1λi) L¯i) ( i1, ... N )
and thus maximizing the subfunction  subject to the budget constraint (4) yields conventionalU i(G ij )
commodity demand functions for each group of enterprise workers. In the calculations we report
later, we assume that the  are CES7U i(G ij )
Trade quotas in this formulation are set such that, at the controlled domestic prices , theP¯i
commodity demands determined from utility maximizing behaviour (i.e., maximizing (3)Di ( P¯ )
subject to (4), and summing across workers in all enterprises), along with the quotas, clear the
domestic markets, i.e,
(6)Di(P¯)NiYi ( i1... N )
The  also have to satisfy the trade balance condition that at world pricesNi
. (7)ˆ
N
i1
P wi Ni0
88 This is in the spirit of satisficing behaviour first described by Simon (1959). 
9 Recent papers by Dong and Dow (1993), and Bai and Wong (1998) also discuss shirking and state
owned enterprise operations; but do not draw the link to trade liberalization we emphasize here. Also see
Mori (1991).
In this formulation, the cash income of workers in the enterprise, , is independent of theW¯i L¯i
amount of shirking.  Shirking is limited by the budget constraint of the enterprise, which requires
sufficient labour be deployed to generate sales to cover costs8. Shirking levels will change if the
government changes prices, either directly (with accompanying changes in Ni ) or as an
accompaniment to  trade liberalization9.
(1)-(7) thus yields a well defined equilibrium structure in which the level of shirking in each
SOE, , is endogenously determined, while workers are guaranteed jobs in their enterprise at a fixedλi
wage. Product prices are fixed, and enterprises have to satisfy their budget constraint. Trade quotas
which meet a trade balance condition support the equilibrium.
Trade liberalization in this framework involves a change in or removal of the trade quotas
. Under a move to free trade,  increase to the point that they are no longer binding, while withNi Ni
more heavily protected trade   decrease.  In the case where the  are no longer binding, theNi Ni
government must set prices, , to equal the world prices . Unrestricted net trades, , are thenP¯i P
w
i Ti
endogenously determined such that 
(8)Di(P
w)TiYi
and 
. (9)ˆ
N
i1
P wi Ti0
From (1) and (2) a move to free trade will increase , reduce shirking, and increase outputλi
in industries that were protected against imports i.e. ( ). This is the opposite productionP¯i>P
w
i
910 This is common in Vietnam. The World Bank (1995) also discusses this phenomenon more
broadly, indicating its presence in many countries. See also footnote 3.
response for protected industries usually associated with an elimination of protection in the
competitive case. Imports may also fall under trade liberalization due to this production response.
In industries where exports are initially restrained by trade quotas, ( ), a  move to free tradeP¯i<P
w
i
will lower  (again from (1) and (2)) increase shirking, and reduce output; also a further perverseλi
supply response relative to that conventional in the literature.  Because of these different effects on
shirking and production in export and import industries, and the lack of marginal conditions linking
shirked effort and SOE effort at the margin, the net effect of trade liberalization on welfare is also
unclear; it can either rise or fall.
A Model with a State Owned and Private Sector
In our second model formulation, we consider shirked labour from SOEs being used in part
time private sector (second) jobs instead of going into leisure consumption. We can modify the basic
model set out above by adding a private sector to it, recognizing that, typically, state owned
enterprises coexist with those in the private sector, although the products produced in each may
differ.  A common observation is of full time employees of SOEs moonlighting, or taking part time
jobs in the private sector (often in services such as tourism, retailing or  business services, and light
manufacturing (clothing, footwear, furniture)). In many transition economies, one often hears of
managers and workers departing from their SOE jobs at some point during the day to work on their
own small business in areas such as these10 .
Under this formulation, the utility function (3) is defined over a vector of SOE products, ,Gj
and private sector goods, , asCk
10
;(j = 1,...N); (k = 1,...K) (10)U i(G ij ,C
i
k ) ( i1, ... N )
where denotes consumption of the privately provided good k by household (worker) type i (in thisCk
i
formulation there are K privately provided goods).
Now shirked labour no longer enters the utility function (3) but the production function for
the state owned enterprise is again given by (1), and the enterprise budget constraint remains as
(2).The household budget constraint for type i workers is instead given by
(11)ˆ
N
j1
P¯j G
i
j  ˆ
K
k1
Pk C
i
k  W¯i L¯i  (1λi) L¯i Wi
where  is the private sector market wage for workers initially employed in state owned enterpriseWi
i; (1-λi) is the portion of labour of type i sold on private sector labour markets; and  is the price ofPk
the private sector product of type k.
Private sector production of good k is  given by the production function
(k = 1,...K) (12)Ck  φk(L
P
k )
αk
where there are again decreasing returns to the variable input . In equilibrium, the total labourLk
P
used in all private sector enterprises equals shirked labour supplied by members of all SOEs, i.e.,
       (13)( )1
1 1
−∑ = ∑
= =i
N
i i k
P
k
K
L Lλ
Since labour in each private sector enterprise is paid its value marginal product, it follows
that 
(k = 1,...K) (14)Wk  φk Pk αk (L
P
k )
αk  1
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The return to the implicit fixed factor in each private sector production process reflects the difference
between the value of output at private sector market prices, , and the payment to the variable factorPk
(shirked labour supplied by SOE members).
In this formulation, private sector goods and labour markets clear in equilibrium, and the λi
are endogenously determined as before. Trade quotas, , are again needed to support prices set byNi
government for the state owned enterprise sectors.  Trade liberalization, represented again by an
elimination of import quotas, will, as before, perversely increase production in protected sectors and
reduce production where export restraints no longer apply. Impacts on imports can again be opposite
to conventional analyses. Whether such a change is welfare worsening or welfare improving are yet
again ambiguous, but now also depend upon the relationship between the value marginal product of
labour in SOEs and the private sector, and the impact on shirking.
Mobility between SOE’s and  the Private Sector
We finally consider a further variant on the basic model above where the membership of
SOEs is variable rather than fixed. In this, workers are mobile between  SOEs and  the private sector
in the event of a shock to the economy, such as trade liberalization. New entry to SOE’s can occur,
and  individual members of  SOEs can choose to terminate their membership and instead work in
the private sector. Part time jobs in the private sector are excluded under this formulation.
In this case, we again specify a private sector production function of the form
                   (k= 1,....K) (15)Ck  φk (L
P
k )
αk
where  denotes to the labour  employed  in the kth private sector.  We again assume that privateL Pk
sector labour is paid its value marginal product, i.e.,
     (K=1,......K) (16)W  φk Pk αk (L
p
k )
αk 1
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where W is the private sector wage. 
Decisions are made by  workers as to whether they should move between   SOEs and the
private sector by comparing the SOE wage plus the marginal utility of shirking (in money metric
terms) they received by remaining in the SOE sector to the wage they would receive (without
shirking) in the private sector. Thus, in contrast to the basic variant model, an equilibrium condition
prevails across these employment options for workers which implies that
           i= (1...,N) (17)W¯i 
V l ( (1λ)i L
s
i )
MUIi
W
where  is the marginal utility of shirking in the SOE  i, and  is the marginal utilityV l ( (1λi)L
s
i ) MUIi
of income of workers of type i. Labour market clearing implies that
     (18)L¯iˆ
K
k1
L Pik L
S
i
where is the endowment,  is the employment in private sector, and is the employment inLi Lik
P Li
S
state sector of  type i labour.
In this formulation, trade liberalization again lowers shirking in SOEs (raising output as
before), and labour flows into SOEs and out of the private sector. Here, since the marginal utility
from shirking affects the labour market equilibrium condition, liberalization can again be either be
welfare worsening or improving.
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2. EVALUATING THE IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE
PRESENCE OF SOE’S: DATA FOR VIETNAM
We have used the three models set out above to numerically investigate the impacts of trade
liberalization in the presence of SOE’s. We examine the effects of trade liberalization on output,
effort/shirking, welfare and trade. We also compare model predictions in the presence of SOEs to
those from comparably specified conventional competitive models which do not recognize SOEs as
distinct entities. In analyzing trade liberalization in these ways, we follow the procedures widely used
in the general equilibrium modelling literature of calibration of model parameters to a base case data
set, followed by counterfactual equilibrium calculations and comparisons to a base case equilibrium
(Mansur and Whalley (1984)). 
We use Vietnamese data for this purpose, both because SOEs remain an extensive part of the
economy in Vietnam and we have data on private and SOE employment in Vietnam for 1995.
Because our focus is partly on quantitative differences in results compared to conventional
competitive models, we keep the analysis simple by examining only 2 groups of enterprises in each
of the models; export oriented and import competing. In our basic model we model two distinct types
of SOEs ; in the other two models we model one SOE (the import competing sector) and one private
sector enterprise, which we assume is also the export sector.
Tables 1 displays  the basic data we use to construct model admissible data sets calibrate the
base case model, along with the values for the labour share and elasticity parameters we employ in
calibration. The central components of this  data comes from the Vietnamese Input-Output Table for
1995 published in 1996 by the General Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance, Vietnam. In
identifying  value added in state owned enterprises, we use estimates of  value added shares for 
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Table 1
1995 Vietnamese Data Used in Constructing More Aggregated Model Admissible 
Data Sets For Counterfactual Analysis of the Effects of Trade Liberalization
(Bill. VND at producers prices)
Estimated Net of Tax Imports Exports Net Net
State Share Value by by Imports by Exports by
Sector in Value Added by Sector Sector Sector Sector
added1 (%) Sector
1 Elec-gas 100 3627 0 0 0 0
2 Water 100 591 0 0 0 0
3 Mining 100 7664 20 6590 - 6570
4 Cons. Materials 80 2478 9161 904 8257 -
5 Steel 90 644 15141 76 15065 -
6 Chemicals 80 1546 7498 494 7004 -
7 Pharmaceutical 70 460 2855 30 2825 -
8 Food processing 60 12259 11992 15716 - 3724
9 Leather 60 257 113 220 - 107
10 Textiles 60 3387 9095 10900 - 1805
11 Electrical 90 879 6572 28 6544 -
12 Other processing 20 8654 15775 1150 14625 -
13 Cultivation 0 32987 3595 13337 - 9742
14 Breading animal 0 9989 244 776 - 532
15 Forestry 30 2372 1744 1320 424 -
16 Fishing 10 6228 2207 6282 - 4075
17 Construction 60 14419 0 0 0 0
18 Transportation 40 5047 2625 1008 1617 -
19 Postal services, tele 100 2711 29 103 - 74
20 Trade, material supply 20 21578 2000 8869 - 6869
21 Finance, banking and insurance 100 4699 0 0 0 0
22 Public administration 100 10411 0 0 0 0
23 Hotel & restaurant 20 5795 1560 6157 - 4597
24 Culture, education, health 90 12308 867 178 689 -
25 Other 40 17502 2850 430 2420 -
Total 188492 95943 74568 59470 38095
Share in aggregate Value
added
43.2
Note: Sectors Aggregated into a single Import competing sector are 1,2,4-7,11-12,15,17,18,21-22,24,25
            The remaining are aggregated into a single export oriented sector.
            1 These data were obtained from interviews with Vietnamese researchers, in the absence of firm available data.
In aggregate these estimates imply an aggregate share of state owned enterprises in value added approximately consistent
with data available for the whole economy.
Source: 1995, Input-Output Table for Vietnam, General Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance, Vietnam.
15
respective SOE and private sectors obtained from interviews with Vietnamese researchers (see
Footnote to Table 1). This information yields a share of the state sector in total value added which
approximately matches the aggregate shares available published data. Employment data both for
state owned enterprises and the private sector are from the Vietnamese Social Affairs Yearbook.
In using these data to produce model admissible data used at a higher level of aggregation
to calibrate our model formulations we make a number adjustments, some of which imply small
modifications to the structure set above. The model admissible data used in this way are set out in
Table 2 for the basic model. We accommodate the trade imbalance in the basic data on Table 1
through an exogenous trade imbalance term in equation (7) which is fixed in real terms. We also
calculate the total value added originating in the state owned enterprise sector, which we then
separate into two parts; one representing an import competing and the other  an export sector. Sectors
which are net importers are aggregated as the import competing sector, and those that are net
exporters are aggregated and classified as the export oriented sector. Total SOE employment is
divided in the same way. 
We assume a production function coefficient on labour for each state owned enterprise of 0.6.
No estimates for this parameter for Vietnam are available, and we somewhat schematically rely on
estimates by Young (1994) of  the labour share parameter for the South Korean manufacturing sector
in the late 1980s of  0.57. Along with the output and employment data we use, this 0.6 value implies
that 33% of labour in the two SOE sectors is shirked in the base case. We subsequently  report
sensitivity of results with respect to alternative values of this labour share parameter value.
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Table 2
1995 Model Admissible Base Case Data and Key Parameter 
Assumptions Used in SOE Trade Liberalization Analyses
Data Used in Calibrating the
Basic Model
Key Parameter Assumptions 
and Calibrated Values
Items Import
Competing
Sector 
Export
Sector 
Items Sector 1 Sector 2
Production (Value
added, bill VN Dong)
55431 26014 Scale parameter in
production (Φ) (set
exogenously)
1 1
Labour Value added
(bill VN Dong)
39005 12924
No of Workers
(thousands)
1880 882 Labour share
parameter (α) (set
exogenously)
0.6 0.6
Returns to capital
(value added, bill VN
Dong)
16426 13090 Work coefficient (λ)
(endogenously
determined)
0.663 0.466
International price (set
exogenously)
0.851 1.0 Consumption share
(β) for  household 1
(endogenously
determined)
0.876 0.124
Tariff rates (%) 17.5 0.0 Consumption share
(β) for household 2
(endogenously
determined)
0.875 0.124
Domestic prices
(world prices plus
tariffs)
1.0 1.0 Elasticity of subs in consumption,  goods
(σ) 1.2 (set exogenously)
Exports (bill VN
Dong) 
- 12726 Leisure sub-utility function elasticity (ρ)
1.5 (set exogenously)
Imports (bill VN
Dong)
38920 -
Source: Basic data come from Table 1
  Employment Data from: Statistical Yearbook of Labour Invalids and Social Affairs
(1996), General Statistical Office, Vietnam. 
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Our data on 1995 tariff rates for Vietnam imply differences between domestic and world
prices. We assume that the only trade intervention is the tariff (i.e., no quotas or other instruments
are used), while in reality other instruments are employed; which we model as an equivalent quota.
Finally, to complete the model specification we need values for substitution elasticities in
preferences. We use 1.2 as the substitution elasticity between goods in the top level utility function
and 1.5 as the elasticity parameter in the leisure sub function since estimates of elasticities of
substitution in preferences for Vietnam are not available. These may appear on the high side, but
mirror parameter values used in nested CES functions elsewhere whose empirical literature is
unavailable (see the values used by Piggott and Whalley (1996), for instance). We use these values
in the base case and perform sensitivity tests around them. 
As is the convention in applied general equilibrium modelling work, we can somewhat
arbitrarily choose units for goods given the value data that we use in calibration. We use units for
goods as that amount which sells for prespecified base period prices (1 million Vietnamese Dong).
Wage rates are then implied by the combination of employment and labour value added data by
sector available to us. We use all the above data and assumed elasticity and other parameter values
to calibrate the model. This yields the values of λi, and βi (consumption shares) reported in Table 2.
The data and assumed parameter values we use in calibrating our second model (with both
SOE and private enterprises) are  reported  in Table 3. For this model, the data on state owned
enterprises from the first model (value added, employment and use of capital) are aggregated into
a single SOE enterprise. Data from Vietnamese government statistical sources give private sector
employment, and value added by labour and capital. We treat the value 
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Table 3
1995 Model admissible Base Case Data and Key Parameters Used in Trade Liberalization
Analyses Using an SOE Model with Both Private and State Owned Enterprises
Data  for SOE and Private Sectors Key Parameter Values Assigned and 
Determined Via Calibration
Items SOE
Sector 
Private 
Sector
Items State Private
Production (value
added, bill VN Dong)
81445 107047 Scale in production
(Φ) (exogenous)
0.923 0.429
No of workersb
(thousands) 
2762 7720
VA by labour (bill
VN Dong)a
51929 65745 Labour share (α)
(exogenous)
0.663 0.614
Fixed capital (value
added, bill VN
Dong)a
29516 41302 Work coefficient (λ)
(endogenous)
0.319 1.0
Assumed
International prices
0.851 1.0 Wage rate
(endogenous)
0.188 0.088
Tariff rates (%) 17.5 0.0 Consumption share
(β) (endogenous)
0.523 0.477
Domestic prices 1.0 1.0 Elasticity of substitution in consumption
among goods (σ) 1.2 (exogenous)
Exports (bill VN
Dong)c
- 8727
Imports (bill VN
Dong)c
26191 -
Sources: See Table 1
Note; a - Capital income in the basic value added data in the private sector in the IO (1995) table is
reduced by a 40 % factor and this is added to the labour component in the same sector to reflect the
undistributed wages of family businesses included in capital income in value added.
b - The no. of workers employed in the private sector is only 6789 (thousands), and shirked labour
from SOE is 931 (thousands) in the base case equilibrium.
c - The implicit trade imbalances in Table 2 and Table 3 are different because Table 2 (model 1) does
not include the private sector, and cross-hauling is present in the trade data in Table 1 which
disappears when SOEs are aggregated in Table3.
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 added by capital as fixed capital required in production. The trade data we use are from the
Vietnamese input-output Table for1995 (see Table 1). A similar unit conventions for prices to earlier
is adopted when calibrating the  model, and tariff rates (quotas) imply a similar relationship between
world and domestic prices. The elasticity of substitution in preferences between goods is again
assumed to be 1.2.  There is no leisure in preferences in this model variant, and so no sublevel
elasticity parameter. Consumption shares (βi), and shirking coefficients (λi ) are again endogenously
determined through calibration.
The data we use to calibrate the third model (with SOE/private sector mobility) are similar
to above, and are reported in Table 4. We  make an adjustment to private sector employment data
in calibrating this model  to ensure that the private sector wage exceeds the SOE wage (which it must
if there is any marginal benefit from shirking), since market wage rates for the private sector are
typically  underestimated as family workers receive profits. Relative to the second model,  the
addition of leisure in the utility function implies  the use of a first order condition linking wage
differentials between SOEs and the private sector to the marginal utility of income. In calibrating this
model variant, we use a value for the leisure subutility function elasticity parameter of 1.5, as is in
the basic model. Calibration of this model to the data in Table 4 using with the wage equality
constraint in equation (17) also involves endogenously determining a scale factor ψ in preferences
which satisfies the wage equality condition between the SOE and the private sector.
  We have used these three model variants calibrated in the ways we indicate above to analyze
the impacts of trade liberalization in the presence of SOEs; contrasting the three sets of  results to
those generated from a comparable conventional competitive trade model with homogeneous
products.  The data we use for the conventional model is the same as for our first model. All our
20
models involve small open economy price taking behaviour, and hence no terms of trade effects are
present.
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Table 4
1995 Model Admissible Base Case Data and Key Parameter 
Values Used in Model Variant with SOE-Private Sector Mobility 
Base Case Data  for SOE Model Key Parameter values Assigned and Determined
Via Calibration
Items State Private Items State Private
Production (value
added, bill VN Dong)
81445 107047 Scale in production
(Φ) (exogenous)
0.949 0.790
No of workersb
(thousands) 
2762 2860
Labour share (α)
(exogenous)
0.6 0.614
VA by labour (bill VN
Dong)a
51929 65745
Fixed capital (value
added, bill VN Dong)a
29516 41302 Work coefficient (λ)
(endogenous)
0.633 1
Assumed International
prices
0.851 1 Wage rate
(endogenous)
0.188 0.230
Tariff rates 17.5 % 0 Consumption share (β)
(endogenous)
0.523 0.477
Domestic prices 1 1 Elasticity of substitution  in consumption of 
goods utility function (σ) 1.2
Exports (bill VN
Dong)c
- 8728 Leisure sub-utility function elasticity parameter
(ρ) 1.5
Imports (bill VN
Dong)c
26191 - Scale parameter in sub-utility function ψ=0.29
(endogenous)
U L Le e( ) ( )=ψ ρ
1
Sources: See Table 1.
Note: a- Capital income in the basic value added data in the private sector in the IO (1995) table is
reduced by a 40 % factor and this is added to the labour component in the same sector to reflect the
undistributed wages of family businesses included in capital income in value added.
b - Private sector employment is set so as to yield a wage differential of 20 % between the private
and SOE sectors given other elements of the data set.
c -The implicit trade imbalances in Table 2 and Table 4 are different because Table 2 (model 1) does
not include the private sector, and cross-hauling is present in the trade data in Table 1 which
disappears when SOEs are aggregated in Table4.
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11 Measured as the Hicksian equivalent variation summed across the two consumer (enterprise)
groups.
12 See also Chan, Ghosh and Whalley (1999) for further assessment of the impact of trade
liberalization in Vietnam using a competitive model structure.
3. RESULTS FROM MODEL ANALYSES
Table 5 reports results of the impact of trade liberalization in Vietnam using 1995 data
generated by  the basic version of the SOE model described earlier, and compares these with results
from both the two elaborations also described above, and to those from as a comparably specified
competitive model. 
In the basic model there are two SOEs, one involved in import competing and the other in
export production. Table 5 reports results for this  model which show an aggregate welfare gain
from a move to free trade, involving the elimination of all trade restrictions, of 4.7% of income11.
This gain stands in contrast to a much smaller gain of 0.5 % from a comparably specified
competitive model12. In these results, the output of the import competing SOE sector from whom
protection is withdrawn increases by 17.5% in contrast to a reduction of 6.7 percent in the
competitive case. Effort increases sharply  (shirking falls) by over 30 %. Trade impacts are much
larger in the competitive case compared to the SOE case, with imports rising 16.5% as against 3.2%
in the SOE case and exports rising 42.9 % as against 8.4% in the SOE case. The smaller trade
changes in the SOE case reflect the increase in output of previously protected enterprises, and the
disciplining of shirking under trade liberalization that occurs, as discussed earlier. The asymmetric
percentage trade change for imports and exports reflect the large trade imbalance in the base case
data.
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Table 5
Impacts of Trade Liberalization in the Basic and Elaborated SOE 
Models and a Comparably Specified Conventional Competitive Model
Base Model
(per cent)
Conventional
Competitive 
Model
Model with
SOE and
Private
Sector 
Model with
SOE and
Private
Sector with 
Labour
Mobility
1.  Welfare gain or loss
(Hicksian EV as % of income) 4.71 0.5 4.2 1.3
2. % Change in imports 3.2 16.5 4.0 -4.5
3. % Change in exports 8.4 42.9 10.3 -11.4
4.   % Change in output of
import competing SOEs
17.5 -6.7 17.5 23.2
5.  Change in output of export
enterprises
0.0 13.2 -4.6 -4.6
6. % Change in shirking in
SOEs 
-60.8 - -60.7 -54.5
7. % Change in effort level in
SOEs
30.8 - 30.8 31.6
Notes:1 The impacts on the two groups of workers (one from each enterprise type) in this case, for
illustrative purposes, are a welfare loss of 0 .3 percent in equivalent income terms for those from the
import competing sector and a gain of 5 per cent for those from the export sector.
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In the other SOE cases, results from the model with an SOE and a private sector (column 3
of Table 5) are broadly similar to those from the basic SOE model (column 1 of Table 5). However,
results from the model where mobility of labour between SOEs and the private sector enters show
more differences. To ensure marginal conditions hold in the labour market in the base case,
calibration involves the selection of a units term for the subutility function for leisure, which
produces a changed marginal valuation of leisure relative to model 1 and different welfare effects
from liberalization. In this case, liberalization generates a larger export response from SOEs to trade
liberalization, but a smaller change in effort. This is due to a reduction in leisure consumption under
liberalization. In this case, and in contrast to model,1 and 3, imports fall rather than rise on
liberalization reflecting the proportionally larger production response from import competing SOEs
that occurs.
The overall picture across all these cases, however, is that trade liberalization in the presence
of SOEs produces results which differ sharply, both qualitatively and quantitatively, from the
competitive case. Output responses from trade protected SOEs are positive rather than negative.
Imports fall as well as rise in some cases. Quantitative impacts suggests much larger welfare impacts
for SOE (by factors of 8-10), along with smaller trade impacts.
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Table 6 reports sensitivity analyses for the results from the basic model reported in Table 4
to values of key parameters used. These showing limited sensitivity to elasticity of substitution (σ)
parameters, while higher values for the labour share parameter (α) yield higher welfare gains from
trade liberalization and lower values small losses. 
The most sensitivity in welfare effects occur under changes in the value of the elasticity
parameter in the leisure subutility function in the model. A higher elasticity yields higher welfare
gains, and for a low value these become losses. The latter occurs where the marginal product of
labour forgone in the SOE when labour shirks exceeds the money metric value of the marginal utility
of leisure. In such cases, labour still shirks, since they receive the wage independently of theirwi
effort level, but the level of shirking is lower. We highlight earlier  the uncertainty of the sign of the
welfare effects from trade liberalization in the presence of SOEs, and here we can locate critical
regions in the parameter space for which the sign of results change. A critical value of  ρ for which
the welfare effect of trade liberalization is zero can be calculated in this model; this is 1.34. A value
of ρ lower than 1.34 yields welfare worsening trade liberalization for this model parameterization.
Sensitivity analyses of results for variations on key parameter values for the other two models
are reported in Table 7. We are able to calibrate the model with mobility such that given the elasticity
values in the leisure subutility function, we can choose units terms for this subfunction such that the
wage equality condition (17) holds. If we change the elasticity parameter values in the leisure
subutility function across different model runs, we must also rescale the utility function in this way
so that equation (17) is satisfied in calibration. Limited sensitivity is again found for both models
with regard to the elasticity of substitution in preferences.  Welfare effects show more sensitivity to
alternative values of the labour share parameters (αi) in production compared to the basic model.
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Table 6
Parametric Sensitivity Analyses of Results on Trade Liberalization
for the Basic SOE Model
Welfare Change 
(Hicksian EV as
% of income)
% Change in
Imports
% Change in
Shirking
% Change in
effort
Central Case 4.7 3.2 -60.8 30.8
High goods elasticity (σ
=2.4)
4.9 9.1 -60.8 30.8
Low goods elasticity (σ
=0.6)
4.5 0.0 -60.8 30.8
High labour product
share (α =0.8)
10.0 3.2 -14.8 22.3
High leisure elasticity 
(ρ =2)
11.1 3.2 -60.8 30.8
Low leisure elasticity 
(ρ =1)
-20.8 3.2 -60.8 30.8
Critical leisure elasticity
for zero welfare effect 
(ρ =1.338)
0.0 3.2 -60.8 30.8
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Table 7
Parametric Sensitivity Analyses of Results on Trade Liberalization
for SOE/Private Enterprise  Model
Welfare Change
(Hicksian EV as %
of income)
% Change in
Imports
% change
in Shirking
% Change in
effort
SOE/Private Enterprise  Model
Central Case 4.2 4.0 -60.7 30.8
High goods elasticity 
(σ =2.4)
4.6 46.3 -60.7 30.8
Low goods elasticity 
(σ =0.6)
4.0 -17.3 -60.7 30.8
High labour product
 share (α =0.8) in SOE
4.9 7.3 -44.0 22.3
Low labour product
share (α =0.5) in SOE
3.6 1.3 -75.0 38.1
Model SOE/Private Sector Mobility
Central Case 1.3 -4.5 54.5 31.6
High goods elasticity 
(σ =2.4)
1.66 39.1 -54.5 31.6
Low goods elasticity 
(σ =0.6)
1.1 -26.5 -54.5 31.6
High labour product
share (α =0.8) in SOE
2.9 7.8 -37.3 21.6
Low labour product
share (α =0.5) in SOE
-1.8 -37.7 -79.8 46.3
High leisure elasticity 
(ρ =1, ψ=23.8)
5.8 26.2 -52.7 30.5
Low leisure elasticity 
(ρ =1.3, ψ=6.3)
3.2 4.7 -53.9 31.2
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4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyse the impacts of trade liberalization in economies with State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs), motivated by both the lack of literature on this topic, and its importance for
work on developing and transition economies. SOEs are modelled as controlled by the members of
the enterprise who set output levels and shirk while facing fixed output prices and wage rates set by
government. Enterprise members must collectively meet the budget constraint that the value of sales
must equal their wage bill plus an exogenous enterprise commitment to the state budget. Once this
constraint is met, labour can shirk either through reduced on the job effort (leisure), or through
moonlighting to second jobs in the private sector. 
Three alternative formulations of equilibria in SOE economies are explored, including
numerically using data for Vietnam. In these, trade liberalization can produce effects opposite  to
those found in conventional competitive models; such as increasing rather than reducing the output
of the import competing SOEs, and potentially changing the sign of the impacts on trade flows and
welfare, even in the small open economy case. Our results point to sharply larger welfare impacts
from trade liberalization in SOE models than is the case in conventional competitive models,
because the initial departures from Pareto optimality in SOE economies can be large. In such cases
our results suggest that trade liberalization can act to discipline the shirking associated with these
inefficiencies. 
The broad implication we draw from our analyses is that to assess policy initiatives, in
developing and transition economies, such as trade liberalization, without explicitly recognizing the
role that SOE’s can play may be misleading. This is especially the case where such enterprises
account for a significant portion of economic activity.
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